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Abstract We examine the relation between CEO network size and the level of real activities management 
(RAM). Using the number of social connections to outside executives, directors, and others in similar 
positions to measure network size, we find that well-connected CEOs associate with higher levels of RAM. 
Social science theory suggests that this occurs because well-connected CEOs can acquire more information 
from their social networks to implement RAM effectively. The power and influence and labor market 
insurance from a large network also reduces the private cost of RAM. Supporting these two channels, we 
find a stronger positive relation between RAM and CEO network size when the CEO connects with more 
informed and influential persons and has more reputation to protect in the labor market. In addition, the 
positive relation concentrates in firms with low CEO share ownership, where a more severe misalignment 
of interests can occur. We also show that higher but not extreme levels of RAM from a large CEO network 
degrades the firm’s long-term operating performance, suggesting that large CEO networks have a darker 
side for firm value. 
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1. Introduction 
A nascent body of literature documents that executive social networks help shape firms’ financial 
reporting policies (Bhandari et al. 2018; Ke et al. 2019; Krishnan et al. 2011).1 These studies indicate that 
the social networks of executives and directors facilitate information transfer within the networks and 
improve corporate financial reporting practice and quality. Bhandari et al. (2018) find that CEOs with larger 
networks have lower levels of accrual earnings management (AEM)2 and fewer financial restatements and 
internal control weaknesses, suggesting that social networks help well-connected CEOs improve earnings 
quality rather than engage in rent extraction. This literature, however, provides an incomplete assessment 
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1 Gibbins et al. (1990) is perhaps the earliest mention in the accounting literature to identify social networks as 
potentially important for firms’ accounting or disclosure decisions. 
2AEM refers to the purposeful altering of reported earnings by changing the methods or estimates for GAAP-based 
expense or revenue accruals to report earnings that differ from unmanaged earnings (Badertscher 2011). 
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of the relation between CEO connectedness and earnings management because it does not consider whether 
and how an executive social network relates to real activities management (RAM), a practice whereby 
managers purposely alter the firm’s cash flow to report earnings based on departures from the timing or 
structuring of normal or optimal operations.  
We know from prior research that a firm manager facing stricter regulation on accounting practices is 
more likely to use RAM to achieve his earnings target. RAM, for example, more frequently occur after the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, which was intended to limit questionable 
accounting practices (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; Gilliam et al. 2015; Koh et al. 2008; Brown and Caylor 
2005) and strengthen auditing standards (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). We also know that the use 
of RAM tends to be limited more by the presence of institutional investors and analysts, who may discipline 
managers for questionable forms of RAM, rather than by GAAP choices (Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 
2006; Zang 2012). We do not know, however, whether RAM is affected by executive social network, a key 
factor determining costs and benefits of corporate operations as well as earnings management techniques.3 
We contend that without an analysis of RAM, it remains an open question as to whether CEO connectedness 
necessarily improves financial reporting quality by reducing AEM, as the prior research would lead us to 
conclude.  
Accordingly, as our core research question, we ask whether CEO network size relates to the CEO’s 
choice of RAM to manage earnings after controlling for other factors that might explain that choice. We 
then explore further this question by examining whether the relation between CEO network size and the 
choice of RAM varies predictably in (i) network characteristics (e.g., the amount of information sharing in 
the network), (ii) manager characteristics (e.g., CEO outside directorships, CEO share ownership), and (iii) 
firm characteristics (e.g., the level of earnings management). Lastly, we examine the related question of 
how RAM relates to the future operating performance of firms with large CEO social networks. Since prior 
studies show that firm managers use between RAM and AEM in a substitutional way (Badertscher 2011; 
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Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012), we control for the level of AEM throughout our 
analysis. It is important to note that while prior studies document the unconditional relation (Badertscher 
2011; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012), our study investigates whether and how 
CEO network size affects the use between RAM and AEM. That is, our study examines the relation between 
these two earnings management techniques, conditional on CEO network size. 
We contribute to the literature by being the first to examine the relation between CEO network size 
and RAM  and to identify the underlying channels through which this relation might generate benefits for 
or detriments to the firm and the top executive. Additionally, while the literature has been silent on whether 
and how RAM alters firm operating performance in a long-term equilibrium, our study sheds new light on 
the channels through which this occurs by showing that CEO connectedness is a key driver of the relation 
between RAM and firm future operating performance. 
The social science literature defines a CEO’s social network as a web of connections developed from 
past service of the CEO in executive, director, and similar positions at other firms, alumni educational 
network associations, and social clubs (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Brass and Burkhardt, 1992; Haunschild, 1993; 
Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi and Potts, 1998; Burt, 2000; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Granovetter, 2005; 
Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). This literature identifies two main channels through which CEO network size 
could influence the level of RAM: (i) an information-sharing and communication channel and (ii) a power 
and influence channel, which also provides insurance against adverse outcomes in the takeover and labor 
markets. The first channel allows CEOs to use the information acquired from others in the network to 
achieve the desired level of managed earnings while minimizing the net costs (e.g., from implementation, 
regulatory, detection, and reputational risks). Compared to other forms of earnings management, RAM 
involves higher complexity and uncertainty (e.g., it needs to be done early in an accounting period, making 
it difficult to predict a precise earnings effect). Studies support the view that larger executive networks 
promote greater information sharing on earnings management and earnings forecasting practices (Chiu et 
al. 2013; Ke et al. 2019). 
The second channel confers power and influence on well-connected CEOs. The implementation of 
RAM is contingent on the CEO׳s ability to persuade and receive support from the board to deviate from 
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normal or optimal operating policies. This channel helps CEOs using RAM by insulating them from internal 
monitoring mechanisms (corporate governance). Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that more powerful CEOs 
tend to appoint directors with ties to the CEO, which weakens board monitoring and leads to more value-
reducing acquisitions. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that firms with board members socially independent of 
the CEO compensate the CEO less and exhibit stronger pay-performance and turnover-performance 
sensitivity.  
The second channel also helps insulate the CEO from takeover and labor-market discipline despite the 
potential for inferior operating performance from RAM in the long run. Due to its cash flow consequences, 
the abnormal or sub-optimal operating policies associated with RAM may aggravate firm future operating 
performance (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). However, social networks enable the executive to weather out 
this disciplinary role of the corporate control market. In the event of involuntary or voluntary termination, 
social networks may provide additional insurance to well-connected CEOs in the executive job market. Liu 
(2014) provides evidence that even though more centrally-located CEOs are subject to more frequent 
turnover, they are also more likely to land promptly an executive-level job.4 El-Khatib et al. (2015) show 
that while CEOs centrally located in the social network frequently initiate value-destroying acquisitions, 
their previous post-merger performance is not related to both the likelihood of their firms being 
subsequently acquired and the likelihood of dismissal by a CEO bidder. As anecdotal evidence of the power 
and influence from a large network, we note that Jack Welch, General Electric’s legendary former CEO, 
who is well-networked, is commonly known to have met or exceeded earnings benchmarks via RAM using 
mergers and acquisitions accounting as well as strategically-timed asset sales to financial institutions.5 
                                                 
4 Ample anecdotal evidence suggest that network or “rolodexes” play a critical role in the CEO labor market. Networks 
can matter for several reasons. First, a main function of managers is to bring together people and other production 
inputs. Managers can make extensive use of networks in the job-ﬁnding process (Burt 2000; Granovetter 2005). 
Second, the skills required for CEO positions can be speciﬁc across ﬁrms. The quality of candidates, their managing 
styles, and other personal characteristics are critical for CEO positions. In a market with high frictions, the board of 
directors tends to rely on social links for credible and in-depth information on a CEO candidate, as discussed by, for 
example, Cao et al. (2006). In addition, the connectedness of CEOs represents their social capital and outside 
employment opportunities. An eﬀective compensation package would take this factor into consideration (Liu 2014). 
5 “Jack Welch was known for his fondness of business acquisitions. ‘Accretive’ means that a merger per se can 
instantly push up E.P.S. if, percentage-wise, the earnings added to the acquirer’s books are larger than the additional 
stock the acquiring firm must issue as part of the merger (if any). This trick works even if subsequently slower growth 
in the acquired firm’s earnings drags down the overall growth of E.P.S. of the combined entities. Remarkably, most 
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It is a priori not certain whether CEO network size increases or decreases RAM. On the one hand, 
network size can improve financial reporting quality by using information extracted from the network. 
CEOs with a larger social network could acquire value-relevant information via their personal and 
professional connections and have a better comprehension of how uncertain and volatile business 
environments affect their firm’s cost structure and product demand and supply. The social network should 
enable them to respond more efficiently to future shocks to their operating environments. Thus, we predict 
that well-connected CEOs will less likely to deviate from their firm’s normal or optimal operating polices 
and engage in RAM (or perhaps not at all) along with lower levels of AEM.  
On the other hand, well-connected CEOs could choose RAM over AEM as the costs and risks of AEM 
are expected to exceed those of RAM. As noted above, both forms of earnings management practices can 
misstate underlying firm performance yet impose different costs and risks on the well-connected CEO. 
With AEM, while the practice may not always be opportunistic or intentional, a large discretionary accrual 
can be costly to firm stakeholders and managers because its detection raises questions about a possible 
violation of the use of GAAP.6 Once detected, AEM can also induce harmful effects on well-connected 
CEOs’ reputation in their social network and outside options from questionable or potentially unlawful 
actions.  
By contrast, RAM adjustments can be less detectable and less costly, and may not raise the same level 
of scrutiny about appropriate GAAP (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Even though 
RAM can exacerbate the inefficiency of corporate cash reserves, well-connected CEOs derive power and 
influence as well as executive labor market insurance via their social network, which further lowers the 
                                                 
financial analysts in the 1990s fell for this trick and bid up its P/E ratio even higher.” (Uwe Reinhardt, New York 
Times, February 13, 2009). 
6 AEM detection, moreover, can significantly affect firm stakeholders if it results in a Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) inquiry, a restatement, or securities litigation (Bruns and Merchant, 1990; DuCharme, Malatesta, 
and Sefcik, 2004; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008; Zhang, 2012). For example, 
DuCharme et al. (2004) show that abnormal accruals are highest for firms with seasoned equity offerings (SEO) that 
are subsequently sued. Settlement amounts are also positively related to the levels of abnormal accruals. Gong et al. 
(2008) show a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger 
announcement lawsuits. CEOs with a large network could ﬁnd litigation resulting from accrual manipulation 
particularly costly because the litigation and penalization tarnishes well-networked CEOs’ reputation, jeopardizing 
their outside options in the executive labor market. Also, AEM is constrained by outside monitoring and GAAP rules, 
making it harder to convince auditors of managers’ earnings management choices (Zang 2012). 
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expected cost of RAM. Thus, CEOs with large networks may engage more actively in higher levels of RAM. 
Thus, it is an empirical question whether CEO network size is positively or negatively correlated witth 
RAM. 
To test these predictions, we first construct the CEO’s social network for a sample of U.S. firms by 
extracting those CEO’s professional, educational, and social connections from BoardEx (Engelberg et al. 
2013). As detailed in Section 4, for network size, we use a measure of CEO connectedness, calculated as 
the sum of direct connections to outside executives or directors linked to the CEO through the executive’s 
past or current business relationships, affiliations with charitable or volunteer organizations, past or current 
service on boards, and past tertiary schools attended. Second, we follow the earnings management literature 
and combine measures of the abnormal level of operating cash flow, production cost, or discretionary 
expenditure to proxy for RAM. This literature shows that this RAM proxy (and related AEM proxies) 
associates with financial reporting behavior in a wide range of settings.7 The use of a RAM proxy also 
avoids a look-ahead bias, which can occur when a researcher uses an ex-post variable (e.g., an SEC 
enforcement action, a restatement, a securities class action lawsuit) to infer earlier financial reporting 
behavior.8 We measure all variables at the firm/CEO level annually and analyze a maximum sample of 
24,549 firm-years and 4,362 unique firms over 1999–2014. 
We document four key findings. First, we find a positive relation between CEO network size and the 
level of RAM, which is both statistically significant and economically meaningful. The average level of 
RAM increases by around four to five percent for every one thousand additional connections. This finding 
                                                 
7 Representative studies include (i) why and when some firms are more likely to engage in earnings management 
(Badertscher 2011; Chan et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 2008; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 
2012), (ii) whether equity incentives matter (Armstrong et al. 2010; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cheng and 
Warfield 2005), and (iii) the effects of detected earnings management on performance (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Gunny 2010), capital costs (Aboody et al. 2005; Francis et al. 2004; Kim and Sohn 2013), debt covenants (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994), and firm value (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Myers et al. 2007). Forms of 
earnings management around different events and in different settings have also been explored. Examples include (i) 
share offerings (Kothari et al. 2005; Teoh et al. 1998), (ii) regulatory changes (Cahan et al. 1997; Cohen et al. 2008),(iii) 
management turnover (Desai et al. 2006; Guan et al. 2005; Hazarika et al. 2012; Wells 2002), (iv) restatements 
(Ettredge et al. 2010; Richardson et al. 2002), (v) litigation events (Dechow et al. 1996; DuCharme et al. 2004), and 
(vi) bad debts (McNichols and Wilson 1988). See Xu et al. (2007) for a review of the pre-2007 RAM literature. 
8 Nonetheless, we test our results using a restatement sample to provide a more complete picture with respect to the 
effect of CEO network size on earnings management (Section 5.4.1). We acknowledge that these proxies represent 
noisy estimates of the earnings adjustment by a CEO or other senior officer to meet a benchmark. 
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supports the prediction that larger CEO social networks associate with higher levels of RAM. The positive 
relation between CEO network size and the level of RAM also persists after we control for the level of AEM 
and when we use alternative network and RAM measures, different time periods, and a two-stage 
instrumental-variable approach.  
Second, we find a stronger positive effect of CEO network size on the level of RAM for networks that 
are more informative or influential, consistent with the two channels through which networks could increase 
RAM. Specifically, we find a stronger positive relation between RAM and CEO network size for connections 
to executive directors who are directly involved in the firm’s operating activities versus indirectly involved 
non-executive (outside) directors, and connections to individuals in S&P 500 firms, which are large and 
reputable compared to others. We consider these connections as conducive to higher levels of RAM because 
they increase information access, exert more influence, and create higher-level employment opportunities. 
We also find evidence of a contagion effect, that is, the level of RAM by the focal firm associates positively 
with the average level of RAM of connected firms, supporting the idea that information on RAM practices 
is transmitted through CEO social connections. 
Third, we find that high levels of RAM presage poorer return on assets and lower operating cash flow 
when the CEO network is large. By contrast, we do not find a negative association between RAM and future 
operating performance when the CEO network is small. Thus, while engaging in RAM per se may not 
necessarily be value-decreasing for a firm,9 larger networks apparently embolden the CEO to deviate from 
optimal operational decision-making to the extent that the costs exceed the benefits to the firm. Consistent 
with Gunny (2010), we find that the negative effect on future operating performance of high levels of RAM 
is attenuated if well-connected CEOs undertake RAM just to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. In other 
words, up to a moderate level of RAM, the choice of RAM is firm-wise desirable to the extent that the net 
benefits from delivering superior earnings to the market exceed the costs of sub-optimal operational 
                                                 
9 Gunny (2010) finds that firms use RAM to more successfully meet or beat a benchmark and have better future 
operating performance. Taylor and Xu (2010) find an insignificant difference in the future operating performance of 
RAM firms and non-RAM firms. 
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decision-making. At an aggressive level, however, the CEO’s preference for RAM could be a symptom of 
misaligned incentives leading to poor operating performance.10  
This third finding suggests a dark side of CEO social networks, in that well-connected CEOs could 
reap more private gain from an aggressive level of RAM to the detriment of long-term firm performance. 
Meanwhile, CEOs who acquire significant power and influence through their social networks are more 
resistant to internal and external monitoring and discipline. This permits them to extract benefits from high 
levels of RAM while bearing few private costs, which leads to firm-wise undesirable and value-decreasing 
operational decision-making. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the positive relation between 
CEO network size and the level of RAM and the negative relation between RAM and future operating 
performance concentrates in the subsample with low CEO share ownership, where the misalignment of 
interests is most severe. 
Finally, we document that CEO network size relates negatively to the level of AEM and to the 
possibility of a future restatement. CEOs with larger networks should also be less inclined to engage in 
aggressive AEM because they could suffer greatly from a reputation loss resulting from a reported GAAP 
departure or class action litigation. When we regress proxies for AEM on CEO network size and control 
variables (including RAM), we find that the coefficient for network size is negative, indicating that well-
connected CEOs are less likely to use high levels of AEM controlling for the level of RAM. These accrual 
and restatement results confirm the findings in Bhandari et al. (2018). However, the conclusion differs from 
Bhandari et al. (2018). We contend that while prior research suggests that larger CEO networks improve 
financial reporting quality through a reduction in AEM, our study indicates that well-connected CEOs use 
a different earnings management technique, or RAM, to achieve their private gains. As such, our study 
offers a more complete portrayal of the relation between CEO connectedness and earnings management by 
examining whether the relation between RAM and network size goes beyond what a substitutional relation 
                                                 
10 The private gains to executives from potential short-term stock appreciation after RAM include increased 
compensation, more outside employment options, and enhanced reputation, which could be amplified for well-
connected CEOs (Engelberg et al. 2013; Liu 2014). Despite research showing that RAM imposes capital costs (Kim 
and Sohn 2013) and may worsen future firm performance (Leggett et al. 2009), a well-connected CEO who justifies 
these activities to the board and other outside powerful executives, and who has access to outside employment 
opportunities, may have less concern for these longer-term costs to the firm. 
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between AEM and RAM might explain (Badertscher 2011; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Zang 2012). Thus, executive social networks play a different role in explaining CEOs’ use of RAM as 
opposed to AEM as an earnings management practice.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 states the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and 
data. Section 4 outlines the research design. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Hypothesis Development 
We combine two strands of literature to develop our hypotheses. We first rely on the social science 
literature to define a CEO’s social network as the number of ties the CEO has to other CEOs and senior 
executives through shared professional, educational, and social experiences. This literature suggests that a 
large network benefits CEOs through two key channels: (i) better access to relevant information internal 
and external to the firm and (ii) higher reputation and greater power and influence (Brass and Burkhardt 
1992; Burt 2000; Coleman 1988; Granovetter 2005; Haunschild 1993; Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Mizruchi 
1996; Mizruchi and Potts 1998; Reagans and McEvily 2003). Higher power and influence can also provide 
insurance against adverse outcomes in the takeover and executive labor markets (El-Khatib et al. 2015; Liu 
2014).11 
In the context of RAM adjustments, a CEO’s social network may be either beneficial or harmful to the 
firm and shareholders. Shared information, for example, may allow network members to improve decision 
making and establish acceptable and (privately) beneficial practices by relying on the information of others. 
More specifically, shared information from the CEO social network may allow executives to choose low 
levels of RAM so as not to deviate noticeably from their firm’s optimal operating policies. In this situation, 
we predict that they will engage more actively in lower levels of RAM (or perhaps not at all) after weighing 
the costs and benefits of these two earnings management practices. In related research, Ke et al. (2019) 
show that CEOs with connections to other top executives within the same firm produce more accurate 
                                                 
11 These two network traits are not separate and distinct, however. Nonetheless, observing the different responses of 
well-connected CEOs to RAM decisions (e.g., the effects of RAM on future operating performance) may shed light on 
which trait dominates in explaining how CEO networks relate to financial reporting. 
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management guidance forecasts.12 However, we also note that dysfunctional information is also shared 
among the social network members. AEM practices are shared among interlocked board members (Chiu et 
al. 2013). Bizjak et al. (2009) show that the practice of backdating employee stock options spreads from 
firm to firm through networks of shared directors.  
With the second channel, well-connected CEOs seek to increase their private interests of wealth and 
reputation by exploiting their power and influence to insulate themselves from internal monitoring by the 
board and external discipline by the executive labor market (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Fracassi and Tate 2012; 
Hwang and Kim 2009; Masulis et al. 2007). Less effective monitoring from larger social ties also influences 
corporate operating activities. Ishii and Xuan (2014) find that social ties between the bidder and target lead 
to value losses, potentially because social conformity weakens critical analysis and due diligence. Chikh 
and Filbien (2011) show that well-connected CEOs continue to support acquisitions even if the market 
reacts negatively upon announcement. Well-connected CEOs could also use RAM to increase their personal 
wealth and reputation, although this would be at the expense of shareholder value in the long run. However, 
the private interests of wealth and reputation of well-connected CEOs with a high ownership stake in the 
firm could also align well with outside shareholders’ interests, which may curtail their use of RAM.  
  
Because the preceding discussion, we state our first hypothesis in the alternative form as follows. 
H1: A firm’s earnings adjustments from RAM vary positively in CEO network size. 
To improve our identification strategy that RAM might causally relate to network size, we test cross-
sectionally whether certain CEO networks, particularly those with more powerful and influential members 
in the network, associate with a higher level of RAM than others. We, thus, conduct tests of whether H1 
holds when the network includes more connections to people of power and influence and those who are 
also likely to share higher-quality information through the network. Below, we discuss two proxies for 
                                                 
12 See, also, Glaeser et al. (1992) and Jaffe et al. (1993). CEO networks also flourish as business organizations that 
actively promote membership based on information sharing, where CEO members can share ideas, best practices, and 
experiences in a confidential and conflict-of-interest free environment (www.chiefexecutivenetwork.com). 
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these factors, whether (i) BoardEx uses the classification of executive director or non-executive director 
and (ii) the network connections involve CEOs at large firms.  
First, executive directors participate in daily corporate operations and have greater direct knowledge, 
reputation, and power to influence decision-making. Connections to executive directors should, thus, 
provide a given CEO with power and influence as well as better information. In contrast, theoretical models 
describe non-executive directors (such as outside directors) as advisors who rely on executive directors to 
provide proprietary information to them (Adams and Ferreira 2007). Thus, their information quality is lower 
than that of executive directors (Ravina and Sapienza 2010). Second, ties to larger firms are more likely to 
deliver competitive advantage and reputation to a given CEO compared to ties to CEOs at smaller firms. 
Firms with a higher market share are also a better source of high-quality information as well as an attractive 
coalition. Conversely, a firm’s size may be merely an outcome of past successful business policies and 
strategies and information that allow for market penetration. Overall, the effects of deriving power and 
influence from executive social networks and their insurance benefits in the labor and takeover markets 
should be stronger for CEOs with powerful and influential connections. Our second hypothesis is as follows. 
H2: The positive relation between CEO network size and RAM strengthens for networks with people 
of power and influence. 
 
Third, we consider whether firms that manage earnings with RAM fare better or worse in the future 
than those that do not (and may also have missed their earnings targets). Firms that engage in RAM may do 
worse because the outcomes to generate the earnings adjustments arise from the inefficient use of cash. The 
evidence on this point is mixed. Gunny (2010) finds that firms conducting RAM to meet or beat a benchmark 
have better future operating performance; Taylor and Xu (2010) find that RAM firms do not differ in future 
operating performance compared to non-RAM firms; and Leggett et al. (2009) find that RAM firms have 
worse future operating performance. These studies, however, do not investigate whether CEO network size 
conditions the relation between RAM and future operating performance. For one, using shared information 
as well as power and influence channels, well-connected CEOs may exploit RAM to achieve private gains 
at the expense of firm value. In that case, we predict a negative association between RAM and future firm 
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performance for CEOs with larger social networks.13 On the other hand, well-connected CEOs may use 
RAM to motivate firm performance, signal firm value, and build reputation (Bartov et al. 2002; Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997; Subramanyam 1996). This view suggests that CEOs extract relevant information through 
their information channels to further optimize their decisions on RAM. Under this scenario, we expect a 
positive correlation between RAM and future firm performance for CEOs with large social networks. We 
examine the relation among RAM, future operating performance, and CEO network size by testing the 
following (non-directional) hypothesis. 
H3: The relation between future operating performance and a firm’s earnings adjustments from RAM 
is conditional upon the size of the CEO’s network. 
 
3. Sample and Data 
We start with the BoardEx database (http://corp.boardex.com/data/), which contains biographical 
information on the senior executives and board members of public and private firms. A November 2015 
BoardEx report provides a summary of board composition and senior management team by year (from 
January 1999 to November 2015) for 12,972 companies in North America. For each director or executive, 
BoardEx compiles a full historical profile containing the past employment history, current employment, 
board memberships, educational background, and social activities such as memberships in social and 
charitable organizations. BoardEx states that they gather and verify information from multiple reliable 
sources and build profiles as complete as disclosure allows.  
 We next extract firm-level financial and accounting information from Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
North America and then merge BoardEx with Compustat by linking the BoardEx firm identifier 
(CompanyID) to the Compustat identifier (GVKEY). BoardEx provides the International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) for firms with stock quotes. We then extract CUSIP from ISIN and match it 
to the GVKEY Compustat header. We are able to find the GVKEY for 7,433 quoted firms in BoardEx 
through this matching process. For the BoardEx firms without ISIN, we use a Levenshtein algorithm 
                                                 
13 We also refine this prediction by examining whether the negative association between RAM and future firm 
performance for CEOs with larger social networks is attenuated when the CEO holds a larger ownership in the firm, 
which should better align the CEO’s private interests with outside shareholders’ interests. 
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(http://www.keldysh.ru/departments/dpt_10/lev.html) to aid in approximate name matching and verify the 
matched pairs manually. We are able to find the GVKEY for an additional 1,007 BoardEx quoted firms 
under this procedure. In total, we find the GVKEY for 8,440 out of 8,558 (98.6%) quoted U.S. firms covered 
by BoardEx. The remaining 118 firms are either too small or too new for Compustat coverage. We obtain 
stock return information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Using the link history 
table of CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) dataset, we merge BoardEx and Compustat fundamentals data 
with CRSP stock return data. To identify a unique CRSP security identifier (PERMNO) for each firm-year 
observation, we ensure that the fiscal year end date is within the effective link dates and choose the link 
with the CCM primary security marker and primary link type marker. 
Table 1 summarizes the 24,549 observation sample by fiscal year and industry classification and shows 
a broad sample of unregulated, non-financial firms, covering approximately 66 and 74 percent of CRSP 
stocks at the beginning and end of the sample period, respectively. Differences in accounting and reporting 
and industry regulation oblige us to exclude firms in the financial (SIC 6000-7000) and the utility industries 
(SIC 4400-5000). While the most represented industries are business services (15.53%), electronic 
equipment (9.69%), and petroleum and natural gas (7.40%), each of the other 39 industries represents less 
than seven percent of the sample. The larger coverage of firms in BoardEx is constrained by the requirement 
for earnings management measures computed from Compustat data. Note, also, that the connections 
forming a CEO’s network derive from links among all organizations in BoardEx biographical histories, not 
just among the sample firms. 
4. Research Design  
4.1 CEO Network Size Measure 
We measure CEO network size annually as the number of executives or directors in the network with 
whom the CEO has connections. We define a CEO network connection at year t as one established between 
a CEO and another individual if they link on one or more of employment, education, or other activities (e.g., 
social club) during or prior to year t. Two individuals are connected via employment if their careers overlap 
with the same employer in the same year. We exclude any connections the CEO has with other individuals 
currently employed at the same firm. 
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Individuals are connected via education if they have graduated within a year from the same university 
and have the same degree type. Education overlaps are identified based on BoardEx education file. 
Following Cohen et al. (2008), we clean the BoardEx education file in two ways. First, for universities with 
multiple Institute IDs, we aggregate them into a single Institute ID. For example, BoardEx assigns “Stanford 
University” ID # 743905436, “Stanford University, Graduate School of Business” ID # 8034910975, 
“Stanford University School of Law” ID # 9164011235, and “Stanford Medical School” ID # 5881139024. 
We merge all of these into the “Stanford University” ID. Universities with an unspecified campus are 
assumed to be the flagship campus. Second, BoardEx does not list a unique ID for degree type, only a 
description of the executive’s “qualification.” We map each of the degree descriptions into (i) 
undergraduate, (ii) masters, (iii) MBA, (iv) Ph.D., (v) law, (vi) medical, and (vii) other education. We drop 
professional certificates such as CFA or CPA designations.  
Two individuals are connected via other social activities if they both have active roles in the same 
professional/non-profit association or social club. Following Engelberg et al. (2013), we require that both 
individuals’ roles exceed mere membership, with the exception of social clubs. We do not require the roles 
to overlap in time, however, because most have missing start and end dates for social activities.  
Our measure of network size for firm i’s CEO sums these direct connections for each year t as follows: 
NETWORK_TOTi,t = ΣNetwork_Employmenti,t + ΣNetwork_Educationi,t + ΣNetwork_Activityii,t where 
Network_Employment sums the CEO’s employment connections, Network_Education sums the CEO’s 
education connections, and Network_Activity sums the CEO’s other-activity connections.14 Table 2 shows 
summary statistics for network size (NETWORK_TOT) (in thousands). The average CEO in our sample has 
145 connections with a standard deviation of 197 connections and a median CEO in our sample has 61 
connections. Similar to Fracassi and Tate (2012) and Engelberg et al. (2013), these data skew to the right.15  
                                                 
14 Our measure of network, based on the sum of a CEO’s direct connections, is often referred to as the “Absolute 
Degree” measure of network connectedness. Other measures of connectedness represent the “Betweenness”, 
“Closeness”, “Eigenvector”, and “Relative Degree” dimensions of network connections. For completeness, we report 
the results of estimating Eq. (5) for each of these other measures. Table 13 reports the results. 
15 As a robustness check, we also specify the natural logarithm of CEO network size as the experimental variable and 
find results qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 4. 
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4.2 Real Activities Management Measure 
Following prior work (Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury 2006), we proxy for RAM by combining 
estimates of the abnormal level of operating cash flow, production cost, and R&D expenditure. First, for 
each firm-year, abnormal operating cash flow equals actual cash flow from operations (CFO) less normal 
CFO defined by Eq. (1) below. 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      (1) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡= operating cash flow in year t of firm i, 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1= lagged total assets, 𝑆𝑖𝑡= Net sales in year t 
of firm i, and ∆𝑆𝑖𝑡= change in net sales from the prior year.  
Second, abnormal production cost equals actual production cost less normal production cost defined by 
Eq. (2) below as a linear function of the cost of goods sold and the change in inventory. 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,        (2) 
where PRODit = COGSit + ∆INVit, 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡  = cost of goods sold in year t of firm i, Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡= change in 
inventory in year t of firm i, and the other variables are defined as before. Abnormal production cost is the 
difference between actual production cost and normal production cost.  
Third, abnormal discretionary expenditure equals actual discretionary expenditure less normal R&D 
defined by Eq. (3) below.  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + β (
𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,     (3) 
where actual 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡= discretionary expenses in year t for firm i calculated as the sum of research and 
development, advertising, and sales, general, and administrative expenses.  
Following Cohen et al. (2008), we combine the three abnormal RAM measures to capture the effects 
of real activities management as a single measure and define RAMit = (CF_RAMit – PROD_RAMit + 
DISEXP_RAMit) times -1. We multiply the summation by -1 so that a higher value represents additional 
RAM earnings from these activities. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics. The average firm reflects a RAM adjustment of -2.5 percent of 
total assets with a median level of 2.7 percent. Thus, on balance, more of the firm-years have positive 
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measures of our proxy for RAM earnings management, that is, reported earnings are more-likely-than-not 
higher due to RAM. While RAM is skewed to the left, we also observe that the approximately equivalent 
Q1 and Q3 quartiles suggest a broadly symmetric distribution around the median value. The balance of the 
variables in Table 2 describes the distribution of the variables in regressions of RAM on network size and 
control variables. Most of the variables reflect distributions similar to those that describe any large and 
diversified sample of listed U.S. firms. For example, 74.5 percent are audited by a Big 4 accounting firm, 
a large majority reflect positive past sales growth (SALES_GROWTH) and future growth opportunities 
(BTM), and the log of market capitalization (SIZE) is reasonably symmetric around the mean of 6.192 (or 
$489 million). We also calculate a proxy for AEM, based on the modified Jones (1991) model.16 Mean AEM 
for the sample is close to zero and ranges between minus 5 and plus 5 percent of total assets for the majority 
of firms in the sample.  
4.4 Regression Models 
To capture the effect of CEO network size on real activities management, we regress RAM on 
NETWORK_TOT and controls, shown below as Eq. (4). We measure all variables on a firm-year basis. The 
equation is:17 
RAMt = 1NETWORK_TOTt + 2AEM + 3SIZE + 4BTM + 5ROA + 6LEV + 7EVOL + 8CFVOL 
+ 9CYCLE + 10SALES_GROWTH + 11MKT_SHARE + 12ZSCORE + NOA + INSTOWN + 
CEO_AGE + CEO_TENURE + t (4) 
We measure the variable of interest, NETWORK_TOT, as the summation of the CEO’s employment, 
education, and other activity connections. Eq. (4) also includes controls to isolate the CEO network effects 
from other firm- and manager-related characteristics. We also add AEM as a control, so that the coefficients 
for NETWORK_TOT capture the response of RAM to network size incremental to the ability of AEM to 
                                                 
16 We define AEM as follows.  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
𝐼𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡= total accruals for a firm i in year t, ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡= change in net revenue in year t-1 to t, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡= change in 
net receivables, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡= gross property, plant, and equipment, 𝐼𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖𝑡−1= income before extraordinary items at year t-
1, and 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1= lagged total assets. We estimate the above regression cross-sectionally for all industry-years with at 
least 15 observations. We then define the estimated residuals as the proxy for accrual-based earnings management, 
that is, AEMit = TAit/ATit-1 – estimated (TAit/ATit-1). 
17 Intercept terms are estimated but not reported for brevity. 
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explain RAM. To control for scale effects and profitability, we include firm size (SIZE), return on assets 
(ROA), financial leverage (LEV), and book-to-market ratio (BTM) (Cohen et al. 2008; Kothari et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006). We also control for earnings volatility (EVOL) and cash flow volatility (CFVOL), 
as some firms may manage volatile performance. To control for the cost associated with real activities 
management, we include sales growth ratio (SALES_GROWTH), market share (MKT_SHARE) and 
financial health (ZSCORE) (Chan et al. 2015; Zang 2012). We also include institutional ownership 
percentage (INSTOWN) as a control because firms with lower institutional holdings may be more inclined 
to cater to retail investors with less awareness of the mechanics of RAM. In addition, we include CEO age 
(CEO_AGE) and the number of years that the CEO has held the position (CEO_TENURE) to control for 
CEO characteristics (Ali and Zhang 2015; Liu 2014). Lastly, we include year- and industry-fixed effects 
and report t-statistics with standard errors adjusted for clustering by industry (since firms in the same 
industry share common factors) and year (since the same CEO may enter in multiple years). 
5. Results 
We present our results in four sections. The first (Section 5.1) examines Eq. (4), which regresses the 
level of RAM on CEO network size and control variables (H1). We then address several endogeneity 
concerns related to CEO network size. We also summarize various robustness tests of the main results from 
this analysis. Our second set of results (Section 5.2) examines whether the network relation in Eq. (4) is 
especially strong when the connections are informative or influential. Specifically, we examine 
hypotheses about whether H1 differs for CEOs with more ties to executives in high level positions, who 
work at larger firms, and whose choice of RAM relates to its use by other firms (H2). A third section (5.3), 
examines the possibility that CEO networks have a darker side by testing hypotheses about the relation 
between RAM and the firm’s future operating performance conditional on network size (H3). A fourth 
section (5.4) examines whether the network effect on RAM differs from earnings management measures 
based on restatements and accruals.  
  18 
5.1 CEO Network Size and the Level of RAM  
5.1.1 Baseline Result 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the main finding of regressing RAM on network size and control 
variables based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The variable of interest in Table 3 is 
NETWORK_TOT, which shows a significantly positive coefficient (p<0.01) in both OLS regressions.18 
Thus, the level of RAM to increase earnings varies positively in CEO network size. This supports H1. As 
the underlying mechanism for this result, we contend that larger CEO networks encourage larger RAM, at 
least from the CEO’s perspective, because the larger network lowers the net cost of the activity to the CEO, 
either through channels that share information (by lowering detection probability or regulatory and labor 
market costs conditional on detection) or through power and influence channels that enhance reputation 
(e.g., by delivering superior earnings to the market). Based on the RAM coefficient in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 3, assuming a relevant range of linearity, one thousand additional social connections increases the 
average level of RAM by 3.88 to 4.65 percent. 
We also observe that several of the control variables, namely, AEM, SIZE, BTM, LEV, CFVOL, 
ZSCORE, and NOA significantly explain RAM at p<0.01. Thus, absent network effects, firms using higher 
levels of RAM are smaller (SIZE), less risky (lower ZSCORE and CFVOL), more leveraged (higher LEV) 
and have higher future growth opportunities (BTM). CYCLE and NOA are also significant, suggesting that 
higher RAM firms have a longer business cycle (CYCLE) and operating (NOA) assets. Also, the positive 
and significant coefficients on AEM indicate that firms use in a complementary way the two different 
earnings management practices such as RAM and AEM. Column 2 of Table 3 also indicates that older CEOs 
or CEOs early in their tenure have higher RAM. 
5.1.2 Endogeneity and Related Issues 
While we have specified models with CEO network size as an exogenous determinant of RAM, the 
positive association between CEO network size and the level of RAM could be subject to endogeneity and 
selection bias. We use several remedies to address these issues. We first consider the possibility that an 
                                                 
18 We also obtain similar significant results (p<0.01) when we scale NETWORK_TOT by total network size for each 
year, indicating that our results are robust to alternative econometric methods or year effects. 
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improvement in accounting performance from RAM could boost the CEO’s visibility and induce an increase 
in network size. As a simple way to alleviate this potential for reverse causality, we lag NETWORK_TOT 
by one year and find a similar positive relation between CEO network size and RAM. Further, we use an 
instrumental variable for CEO network size, DIR_SUPPLY100, which is the number of executives and 
directors of other firms in the same industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) within 100 miles of the firm’s 
headquarters. We contend that the geographical proximity to other executives is likely to be positively 
associated with the connectedness of the CEO but is unlikely to result from a higher level of RAM. While 
the RAM conducted by CEOs could induce better short-term performance and enhance their visibility and 
connectedness, RAM is unlikely to attract other executives to relocate in the same area. 
This instrumental variable approach also helps address selection bias, that is, the expectation of 
beneficial RAM could prompt a CEO to intentionally build stronger networks to maximize the benefits. For 
example, CEOs who contemplate using RAM could choose to become involved in a social organization or 
serve as an outside board member for a public company. The instrumental variable based on geographic 
location is immune to this alternative interpretation because CEOs may have little control over where the 
firm is located. Even if they do, they are unlikely to relocate to a firm just for the purpose of conducting a 
certain accounting practice. 
 A more general endogeneity issue relates to omitted variables. Perhaps network size is correlated with 
some unobservable CEO characteristic that causes a high level of RAM. A suitable instrument in our context 
would be a variable that affects the CEO network (relevance condition) and affects RAM only through its 
effect on CEO network (exclusion condition). Geographic distance has been shown to affect accounting 
practices through social networks in prior research. For example, Choi et al. (2012) suggest that geographic 
proximity between auditors and firms enhance audit quality because they may “have informal interactions 
in business or social settings, allowing for more information to be passed between individuals.” Similarly, 
we contend that CEOs close to many other executives and directors are more likely to have a large network, 
and hence better information and power and influence to conduct RAM. The instrument meets the exclusion 
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condition to the extent there is no other reasonable channel linking the location of the firm’s headquarters 
to the use of RAM.19 
To strengthen our prediction that NETWORK_TOT relates to DIR_SUPPLY100 incremental to 
industry effects, we also include average network size for the other firms in the dataset in the same industry 
of firm i in year t (IND_NETWORK) as an additional instrumental variable. We estimate the following 
equation. 
NETWORK_TOTt = DIR_SUPPLY100 + IND_NETWORK + AEM + SIZE + BTM + ROA 
+ LEV + EVOL + CFVOL + CYCLE + SALES_GROWTH + MKT_SHARE + 
ZSCORE + NOA + INSTOWN + CEO_AGE + CEO_TENURE + t  (5) 
The last two columns of Table 3 present the findings of a two-stage least squares model using the 
instrumental variables, where the second-stage includes predicted NETWORK_TOT from the first-stage. 
We observe that the first-stage coefficients for DIR_SUPPLY100 and IND_NETWORK are positive and 
significant, indicating that these two instrumental variables are a significant source of exogenous variation 
in NETWORK_TOT (meets the relevance condition). The Cragg-Donald Wald F and the Hausman (1978) 
endogeneity test provide further validation of the instrumental variables. The second-stage coefficient for 
NETWORK_TOT is positive and significant, supporting our baseline result that CEO network size increases 
the level of RAM. 
 A specific omitted variable issue is that CEO network size could relate to managerial ability so that 
more skillful CEOs conduct more RAM. To address this, we assign to each CEO observation a measure of 
managerial ability for the same firm-year. We use a proxy for managerial ability (Demerjian et al. 2012).20 
We then estimate Eq. (4), including ABILITY as an additional control variable. We continue to find a 
significantly positive coefficient for NETWORK_TOT, so that the main result in Table 3 holds after 
controlling for managerial ability. 
                                                 
19  Knyazeva et al. (2013) use the number of directors within 100 miles as an instrumental variable for board 
independence. They argue that proximity to larger pools of local director talent leads to more independent boards 
without directly influencing firm performance. 
20 Available at http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. 
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Another concern is that the observations surrounding CEO transitions are particularly prone to 
simultaneity problems because both RAM and CEO network size can change for various reasons during this 
time. A CEO could be hired to improve accounting and reporting quality. In particular, “big bath” earnings 
adjustments could be made to make the new CEO look good. Henry and Schmitt (2001) show that firms 
are exposed to marginal downside risk by taking a big bath, yet a clear upside arises from recording the 
large and extreme losses this period, which reduce future periods of the burden and pave the way for a 
newly-appointed CEO to meet or beat an earnings benchmark in the future. Further, a board could consider 
network size in selecting a new CEO and appoint a better-networked candidate. These changes may lead to 
a spurious correlation between RAM and CEO network size. Therefore, as an additional test, we exclude 
the firm-year observations with a CEO change in the year of the change or one year later (TENURE = 0 or 
1). Our findings in Table 3 remain similar after making this adjustment.  
5.1.3 Other Robustness Tests 
First, we consider alternative measures of CEO network size. Eq. (4) uses the number of direct 
connections to measure network size, which is a measure of the absolute degree centrality in graph theory. 
While it has been used in the literature for ease of interpretation (Engelberg et al. 2013; Javakhadze et al. 
2016), other centrality measures may capture further aspects of connectedness. We consider four additional 
centrality measures as alternatives, reflecting: (i) how frequently the CEO lies on the shortest path between 
pairs of other individuals in the network (betweenness), (ii) the average degrees of separation between the 
CEO and others in the network (closeness), (iii) how well connected are those individuals who are in the 
CEO’s network (eigenvector), and (iv) the number of first-degree connections in the network relative to 
total network degree (relative degree).21 Online Supplement A indicates that our findings in Table 3 are 
robust to most of these alternatives. Second, we consider concerns that BoardEx individual educational 
backgrounds and other activities are self-reported and contain incomplete information. In an alternative 
specification, we use Network_Employment connections only since CEO employment histories are the most 
                                                 
21 These measures are popular in the sociology literature and have been used in recent finance literature (Liu 2014; 
Hochberg et al. 2007; Renneboog and Zhao 2011). Appendix A of Liu (2014) states the mathematical definitions of 
the centrality measures used in this study. 
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accurate and complete. Our results are robust to this alternative network measure. Third, we use two 
alternative measures of RAM. Gunny (2010) suggests abnormal R&D expense and abnormal gain from 
asset sales as measures of RAM. We find our results hold using these two alternative RAM measures, that 
is, abnormal R&D expense and abnormal gain from asset sales also increase in CEO network size. 
Fourth, we consider a possible spurious relation between network size and RAM that could arise if the 
level of RAM and executive network size follow a similar time trend. To control for this possibility, we 
estimate Eq. (4) as a time-series regression for each firm over the sample years 1999–2014. We then test 
whether the mean of the cross-sectional distribution of the NETWORK_TOT coefficients from the firm-
level regressions is positive for RAM. We find that the mean coefficient under this time-series approach for 
NETWORK_TOT is significantly positive, which is the same result as in Table 3. The findings in Table 3 
also hold for subsamples split on pre- and post-2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act observations.  
5.2 Influential or Informative Connections 
If larger CEO networks increase RAM through information or power and influence channels, which is 
our main hypothesis, this also implies that the positive effect of network size on RAM should strengthen 
when the connections are more influential or informative. We consider three proxies, namely, CEO 
connections to executive versus non-executive directors (Section 5.2.1), CEO connections to people in large 
versus small firms (Section 5.2.2), and CEO connections to firms with higher use of RAM (Section 5.2.3). 
The findings summarized below indicate the cross-sectional patterns are consistent with this implication. 
5.2.1 Connections to Executive vs. Non-Executive Directors 
If the benefits of a large CEO network derive from shared information, then we should observe stronger 
results for networks whose information sharing relates to CEO connections with more influential people 
such as other CEOs or similar insider executives. There is a potential flipside, though, in that CEOs who 
benefit from greater information sharing from their networks could face steeper costs and risks to their 
reputation in the event of detected RAM linked to their CEO position. However, RAM has low detection 
risk compared to an equal adjustment from AEM or related practices (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). We use 
BoardEx’s classification of ED (executive director) and NED (non-executive director) and contend that a 
CEO’s link to a NED at another firm offers less ability to share information or enhance reputation than a 
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link to an ED at another firm. Compared to non-executive directors, executive directors engage in firm 
business operations on a daily basis, thus having access to firm proprietary information. They also exert 
power and influence in the selection process of executive and non-executive members and mergers and 
acquisitions, thus influencing the labor market and takeover market. Prior studies show differences in 
findings consistent with this dichotomy (Adams and Ferreira 2007; Engelberg et al. 2012; Ravina and 
Sapienza 2010). 
We test this idea by re-estimating Eq. (4) separately for NETWORK_TOT for ED and NETWORK_TOT 
for NED as the network size variables. Table 4 indicates the findings. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 confirm 
that the NETWORK_TOT coefficient for ED is more positive than for NED. Moreover, the difference 
between the coefficients (column 1), ED-NED, is significantly positive (p<0.01). These findings confirm 
that CEO networks with more information sharing and more ties to people of power and influence associate 
with higher levels of RAM (supports H2). 
5.2.2 Connections to Large vs. Small Firms 
 Connections to people at large firms potentially provide access to more economically-significant 
information and may generate higher influence and expand outside employment options. If the underlying 
channel of network-induced RAM is driven by information or influence, we should expect a larger effect 
from the connections to large firms. To test this hypothesis, we measure network size for CEO connections 
involving S&P 500 firms versus others.22 Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the findings of re-estimating 
Eq. (4) with the number of connections to 500 firms (S&P 500) and the number of connections to non-S&P 
500 firms (Other). The results show that the magnitude of the network effect on RAM is larger for 
connections to S&P 500 firms versus connections to other firms. The difference of the two coefficients is 
significant at the one percent level (column 3). These results indicate that the network benefits of RAM are 
higher for CEOs with network connections to large firms (supports H2). 
                                                 
22 Note that the CEO need not necessarily have a CEO position with an S&P 500 firm in year t. Rather, it is simply 
that the measurement of CEO network size captures ties to persons in other S&P 500 firms only. 
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5.2.3 The Use of RAM by Connected Firms 
 Assuming CEOs’ decision-making process is influenced by the information percolating through their 
social connections, the use of RAM in connected firms will be especially relevant in affecting the level of 
RAM in the firm managed by the CEO. We, therefore, measure the average level of RAM over the prior 
three-years by the other firms in the CEO’s network in the same 48 Fama-French industry category 
(Connected_RAM). Column 5 of Table 4 indicates that the coefficient for Connected_RAM is significantly 
positive (p<0.05). Thus, RAM not only associates with the overall size of the CEO’s network, 
NETWORK_TOT but, also, with the use of RAM by other firms in the CEO network (Connected_RAM), 
which is direct evidence supporting the information channel of a social network. This is also consistent with 
the contagion effect of earnings management (Chiu et al. 2013), where extreme earnings management in 
one firm spreads to other firms through shared directors.  
5.3 Network-Induced RAM and Future Operating Performance  
5.3.1 RAM and Future Operating Performance Conditional on Network Size 
While a large network reduces the net costs for the CEO to engage in a higher level of RAM, this 
behavior may not necessarily benefit the firm, as the prior literature on the relation between RAM and future 
operating performance shows mixed results (Gunny 2010; Leggett et al. 2009; Taylor and Xu 2010). This 
prior work does not, however, consider the role of CEO network size. CEOs with large networks could 
have higher private benefits and lower private costs from RAM because they are more capable of selecting 
a form of RAM with low detectability and are less concerned with poor long-run profitability due to labor 
market insurance. Therefore, we conjecture that the level of RAM chosen by well-connected CEOs would 
go beyond what is optimal for the firm. To test this hypothesis, we measure future operating performance 
as return on assets (ROA) or operating cash flow (CFO) in a future year relative to earnings management 
measurement in year t, where ROA equals net income before extraordinary items divided by the prior year’s 
total assets. 23 
                                                 
23 We exclude t+1 to avoid the predictably negative relation between current accruals and next year’s net income. 
Table 9 also excludes the results for t+2, as they are qualitatively the same as those for t+3. 
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Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of estimating the effects of RAM on future operating performance, 
split on small and large CEO network size. We regress ROA or CFO for year t+3 on firm size (SIZE), book-
to-market ratio (BTM), leverage (LEV), stock return (RET), insolvency risk (ZSCORE) for subsamples with 
CEOs with small and large networks (the results for t+1 and t+2 are similar). We expect that RAM conducted 
by well-connected CEOs will have a more negative effect on future firm performance. For the control 
variables, we expect significantly positive coefficients for all variables except LEV, which should relate 
negatively to future return performance, as high LEV suggests riskier operations. 
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that higher RAM associates with lower future operating performance for 
large CEO networks. Moreover, the differences in the RAM coefficients for small and large networks in 
columns 1 and 2 are negative and significant for the two comparisons (p<0.01 for ROAt+3 and p<0.05 for 
CFOt+3). We also show this in pooled regressions with an interaction term, that is, the coefficients in 
columns 3 and 6 for RAM*NETWORK_TOT are significantly negative (p<0.01). Hence, our findings 
indicate that although RAM per se may not be detrimental to the firm on average, the level of RAM induced 
by a large CEO network associates negatively with future operating return (ROA) or cash flow (CFO). 
These results, thus, support H3–that the relation between RAM and future firm performance is conditional 
on CEO network size. 
Panel B of Table 5 refines H3 by examining whether the negative association between RAM and future 
firm performance for large networks in Panel A is aggravated when the CEO holds a smaller ownership in 
the firm. The positive coefficients for DIFF in columns 1 and 3 of Panel B support this idea by showing 
that the relation between RAM and future operating performance is more negative when CEO ownership is 
low, consistent with the presence of agency costs from misaligned equity incentives. 
These results also suggest that higher levels of RAM induced by large CEO networks could be more 
extreme than what is good for the firm or the CEO. For reputational reasons and through information shared 
in the network, a well-connected CEO may not be willing to engage in extreme or high levels of RAM, 
possibly because high or extreme RAM would be more detectable and generate lower future operating 
performance. To test this idea, we employ quantile regression method. The OLS estimates provide a 
statistically and economically significant and positive relationship between CEO network size and RAM. 
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However, the relationship can be nonlinear.  Using the quantile regression method, we examine the relation 
between CEO network size and RAM, depending on the RAM distributions. Table 6 reports the findings. 
When levels of RAM is low, the coefficient for NETWORK_TOT is significantly positive with p-value < 
0.01. But when levels of RAM is high, the coefficient for NETWORK_TOT is insignificant. Specifically, 
the relation between CEO network size and RAM is positive in the left tail where levels of RAM is low, but 
insignificant and negative in the right tail where levels of RAM is high. The difference in the magnitude of 
coefficients between 80 and 20 percentiles of RAM is significant. So, the CEO network size has asymmetric 
effects on firm real earnings management activities at the left and the right tails of RAM distribution. This 
result, thus, supports the view that the positive relation between network size and RAM (Tables 3 and 4) is 
more relevant when the level of RAM is lower or modest versus higher or extreme. 
5.3.2 RAM to Beat an Earnings Benchmark 
Gunny (2010) suggests that RAM in a particular setting may be beneficial to the firm by providing 
evidence that firms using RAM to beat an earnings benchmark have better future operating performance 
than those not using RAM to beat the benchmark (and, thus, using RAM for other reasons). We test whether 
the negative performance effect that we find is mitigated for well-connected CEOs engaging in this type of 
RAM. Following Gunny’s approach, we identify firms that undertake RAM to just meet zero earnings or 
beat last year’s earnings as those firm-years with net income or change in net income divided by total assets 
≤ 0.01(BENCH). For different levels of adjusted ROA or adjusted CFO for t+1, we regress NETWORK_TOT 
on RAM with an interaction variable for BENCH*RAM. Table 7 shows mostly negative coefficients for the 
overall effect of RAM on future operating performance for well-connected CEOs (also shown in Table 5) 
but mostly positive coefficients for the interaction of BENCH*RAM. That is, RAM to beat the benchmark 
relates positively with future operating performance. We then split the sample on CEO network size. 
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 7 indicate that the coefficient for BENCH*RAM is significantly positive for firms 
with large CEO networks (Top Tercile) but not for firms with small CEO networks (Bottom Tercile). The 
latter have small or negative interaction coefficients (columns 2 and 4). Thus, we extend Gunny (2010) by 
showing that the positive coefficient for BENCH*RAM concentrates in the sample where CEO network size 
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is large. In other words, the overall negative effect of RAM on future operating performance (Table 5) is 
attenuated if well-connected CEOs undertake RAM to meet an earnings benchmark (Table 7). 
5.3.3 Reining in Network-Induced RAM with CEO Share Ownership 
Given our finding in Table 5 that higher RAM associates with lower future operating performance for 
firms with large CEO networks, the potential gains from this earnings management practice accrue to the 
CEO rather than the firm. As such, higher levels of RAM related to large CEO networks may be considered 
as an agency problem. If CEO and shareholder interests do not align well (e.g., the CEO has low ownership), 
the CEO might act more opportunistically. Because the cost of RAM to the CEO is low even though the 
cost to firm value could be high, we should observe a stronger positive relation between NETWORK_TOT 
and RAM when a well-connected CEO has low share ownership. We find this result in Table 8. The 
coefficient for NETWORK_TOT*Ownership is significantly negative (column 1), and the positive 
coefficient for NETWORK_TOT for lower CEO ownership (column 2) is significantly greater than the 
NETWORK_TOT coefficient for higher ownership (column 3), which is significantly negative.24 
5.4 CEO Network Size and Other Types of Earnings Management 
We argue that the low detectability and cash flow consequences of RAM can make it more preferable 
for CEOs with large networks due to lower net private costs. We broaden our inquiry by examining whether 
the effect of CEO network size varies for other proxies for earnings management that CEOs might consider 
as alternatives. As detailed below, network size varies negatively with restatements (Table 9) and a proxy 
for AEM (Table 10). These tests distinguish RAM from other means to manage earnings, where a large 
network could have the opposite effects on the earnings management practice. 
5.4.1 Restatements 
We consider a restatement as evidence of a material accounting irregularity (that more-likely-than-not 
reflects AEM) in an earlier period. Restatements also associate with poorer future job prospects for 
terminated CEOs (Desai et al. 2006). To estimate the relation between restatements and network size, we 
re-estimate Eq. (4) as a logistic regression by replacing the dependent variable RAM with Restatement, set 
                                                 
24 The negative relation between RAM and future operating performance for well-connected CEOs (Panel A of Table 
7) is also more negative for CEOs with lower ownership in the firm (Panel B of Table 7). 
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equal to one for firm-years with a restatement announcement relating to the Audit Analytics categories of 
financial fraud, errors, and regulatory investigation (www.auditanalytics.com) and zero otherwise. Because 
AEM has been linked a future restatement (Ettredge et al. 2010; Richardson et al. 2002), we lag AEM as a 
control variable by one year in Eq. (4). We expect CEOs with larger networks to refrain from this detected 
form of irregularity, as a restatement represents a material correction to a firm’s earnings and shareholders’ 
equity. The findings in Table 9 confirm this expectation and show significantly negative coefficients 
(p<0.05) for NETWORK_TOT for both specifications of Eq. (4) estimated as a logistic regression with 
Restatement as the dependent variable. Thus, Restatement, which represents the outcome of an accounting 
irregularity (e.g., a GAAP violation) in a prior period, associates negatively with CEO network size.  
5.4.2 Accrual Earnings Management 
While AEM may not always be opportunistic or intentional, a large discretionary accrual could 
constitute a departure from GAAP, potentially reportable by the auditor.25 This could result in additional 
outside scrutiny, a restatement, an Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation, or class 
action or enforcement litigation (Dechow et al. 2012; Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; DuCharme 
et al. 2004; Gong et al. 2008; Karpoff et al. 2008a; Richardson et al. 2002; Zang 2012). Also, survey results 
show that CEOs perceive AEM as more ethically questionable than other forms of earnings management 
(Coram et al. 2016). Given this evidence, we predict that well-connected CEOs with more social capital to 
lose will reflect lower levels of AEM. Supporting this argument, Table 10 indicates that when AEM is 
regressed onto NETWORK_TOT and controls, the coefficient for NETWORK_TOT is negative or insignificant 
(p<0.01). This result implies that greater CEO network size amplifies the regulatory and reputational costs 
of AEM, limiting the size of the AEM adjustment. It is also consistent with Bhandari et al. (2018), who 
report a negative relation between the level of AEM and CEO network size. 
Further, we predict that the effect of CEO network size on AEM should be stronger at the right tail of 
the AEM distribution, suggesting that a higher level of AEM generates an expectation of higher legal and 
                                                 
25 Jeffrey Immelt, the successor chairman at GE, with fewer social connections than its former legendary CEO, Jack 
Welch (according to our data set), was reported to have engaged in AEM. As a result, he incurred substantial 
reputational and regulatory costs, including a $50 million fine paid to the SEC. 
  29 
reputational costs. By contrast, the use of a lower level of AEM could be warranted on the basis of judgment 
within accounting choice under the Supreme Court ruling in the Tellabs decision (Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., No. 06-484, 437 F. 3d 588), which allows for reasonable, i.e., more-likely-than-not, 
explanations of accounting choice as a defense against plaintiffs’ allegations. The cost and litigation risk 
associated with a lower level of AEM could, therefore, be lower than for a higher level of AEM. Supporting 
this argument, columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 show that when we split our sample on Large AEM and Small 
AEM and run the regression of AEM onto NETWORK_TOT and controls, the coefficient of NETWORK_TOT 
is more negative and significant for the Large AEM subgroup (p<0.05).  
6. Conclusion 
Based on established proxies for real activities management (RAM), and after employing a wide array 
of controls for other possible factors, we find a positive relation between CEO network size and the level 
of RAM. We theorize that this positive relation occurs because the information-sharing and power and 
influence channels from a large CEO social network enable the use of RAM to confer net benefits on a 
connected executive. This may even make the practice firm-wise desirable in the short term because the 
firm reports a superior trend of earnings, beats earnings benchmarks, and may reduce information 
asymmetry, all of which can increase firm value. In the long term, however, we show that large RAM 
adjustments by well-connected CEOs associate with worse future firm performance, even in the absence of 
detection. But with labor and takeover market insurance, a well-connected CEO may not care about the 
possibility of worse future firm performance from the consequences of departures from normal or optimal 
operations from RAM. These CEO network benefits may also explain the pervasive and popular use of RAM 
in practice. To our knowledge, we are the first to show that larger CEO networks associate with higher 
levels of RAM. Those higher earnings adjustments, however, can degrade firm performance in the longer 
term. Thus, when a large CEO network amplifies the power and influence of the top executive, our study 
indicates that such CEO networks have a darker side regarding future firm performance. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Earnings Management and Network Variables: 
AEM  = Accrual based earnings management measure, firm's current discretionary accrual. 
CF_RAM  = Abnormal cash flow from operations, measured as the deviations from the predicted values of the 
corresponding industry-year regression and then multiply -1. High value represents more 
abnormal level of operating cash flow. 
DISEXP_RAM  = Abnormal discretionary expenses, measured as the deviations from the predicted values of the 
corresponding industry-year regression and then multiply -1. High value represents more 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses. 
Network_Education  = Summation (in thousand) of the CEO’s educational ties. An educational tie occurs if the CEO 
went to the same university at the same time with another executive or director. 
Network_Employment   = Summation (in thousand) of the CEO's employment ties. An employment tie occurs if the CEO 
currently or historically overlapped with another executive or director 
Network_OtherActivity  = Summation (in thousand) of the CEO’s other activity ties. Another activity tie occurs if the CEO 
participated in a same organization (e.g., charity or recreational club) at the same time as another 
executive or director. 
NETWORK_TOT  = Summation (in thousands) of Network_Employment, Network_Education, and 
Network_OtherActivity. 
Connected_RAM =  The average RAM in the prior three years of other firms in the same Fama-French industry 
category. 
PROD_RAM  = Abnormal production cost, measured as the deviations from the predicted values of the 
corresponding industry-year regression and then multiply -1. High value represents more 
abnormal level of production cost. 
RAM  = Total amount of real transactions management, computed as the sum of CFRAM, PRODRAM and 
DISEXPRAM, as defined by Cohen et al. (2008). 
Other Variables: 
  
Analyst_Error  = Analyst forecast error that is measured as the difference between actual earnings per share. 
BIG4  = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 CPA firm, and 0 otherwise. 
BTM  = Book to market ratio.  
CEO_AGE  = Natural log of one plus CEO’s age at the fiscal year t. 
CEO_DUAL  = 1 if the CEO has the dual positions of chairman at the beginning of the fiscal year containing 
quarter t-1, and 0 otherwise 
CEO_TENURE  = Number of years that the CEO has held the position of chief executive officer as of the beginning 
of the fiscal year 
CFVOL  = Standard deviation of operating cash flow on asset for five years. 
CYCLE  = Thousand days receivable plus the days inventory less the days payable. 
DIR_SUPPLY100 = Number of directors in the same industry (based on 2-digit SIC code) within 100 miles of the 
firm’s headquarters. 
EVOL  = Standard deviation of ROA for five years. 
IND_NETWORK = Average network size for the other firms in the dataset in the same industry (based on the Fama-
French 48 industry classification). 
INDADJ_ROE  = Firm’s return on equity minus industry ROE. Industry ROE is calculated as the mean ROE of 
firms in the same industry (based on 2-digit SIC code) for the same period. 
INSTOWN  = Percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutions. 
LEV  = Firm’s leverage ratio, measured as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. 
LNSALE  = Natural log of sales at year t. 
MKT_SHARE = Herfindahl index using two-digit SIC-codes 
NOA = 1 if the net operating assets (i.e., shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities and plus 
total debt) at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales is above the median of the 
corresponding industry-year, and 0 otherwise. 
Ownership = Percentage of common shares in firm held by the CEO at year t. 
Post_Position  = 1 if the departed CEO has a new full-time position in another organization within two years of 
turnover, and 0 otherwise. 
RET  = Firm's raw return for the fiscal year t. 
RETVOL  = Standard deviation of monthly raw stock returns for five years. 
ROA  = Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
SALES_GROWTH  = One-year sales growth ratio. 
SIZE  = Natural log of market value. 
ZSCORE = Altman’s Z-score (Altman 1968, 2000) 
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 
 
Panel A. Sample distribution by fiscal year 
Fiscal Year Frequency Percent 
1999 66 0.27 
2000 651 2.65 
2001 813 3.31 
2002 861 3.51 
2003 1,717 6.99 
2004 1,914 7.80 
2005 1,966 8.01 
2006 1,913 7.79 
2007 1,805 7.35 
2008 1,806 7.36 
2009 1,703 6.94 
2010 1,696 6.91 
2011 1,966 8.01 
2012 1,962 7.99 
2013 1,986 8.09 
2014 1,724 7.02 
Total 24,549 100.00 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution by Fama-French 48 industry classification 
Industry Frequency Percent Industry Frequency Percent 
Agriculture 61 0.25 Machinery 1,066 4.34 
Aircraft 156 0.64 Measuring Equipment 744 3.03 
Apparel 390 1.59 Medical Equipment 1,201 4.89 
Automobiles and Trucks 431 1.76 Industrial Metal Min.. 267 1.09 
Beer & Liquor 109 0.44 Other Industries 117 0.48 
Business Services 3,812 15.53 Personal Services 240 0.98 
Business Supplies 320 1.30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 1,817 7.40 
Candy & Soda 98 0.40 Pharmaceutical Products 1,486 6.05 
Chemicals 736 3.00 Precious Metals 254 1.03 
Coal 111 0.45 Printing and Publishing 214 0.87 
Computers 1,171 4.77 Recreation 230 0.94 
Construction 240 0.98 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 460 1.87 
Construction Materials 661 2.69 Retail 1,689 6.88 
Consumer Goods 484 1.97 Rubber and Plastic Products 195 0.79 
Defense 86 0.35 Railroad Equipment 52 0.21 
Electrical Equipment 573 2.33 Shipping Containers 84 0.34 
Electronic Equipment 2,378 9.69 Steel Works Etc 418 1.70 
Entertainment 385 1.57 Textiles 84 0.34 
Fabricated Products 59 0.24 Trading 236 0.96 
Food Products 518 2.11 Transportation 59 0.24 
Healthcare 484 1.97 Wholesale 373 1.52 
   Total 24,549 100.00 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. 25%-tile Median 75%-tile 
NETWORK_TOT           24,549  0.145 0.197 0.011 0.061 0.198 
NETWORK_TOT 
based on executive director networks (ED)           24,549  0.025 0.034 0.003 0.011 0.033 
NETWORK_TOT 
based on non-executives director networks (NED)           24,549  0.155 0.180 0.031 0.083 0.210 
S&P 500           24,549  0.058 0.086 0.003 0.022 0.075 
OTHER           24,549  0.122 0.135 0.028 0.071 0.164 
RAM           24,549  -0.025 0.987 -0.250 0.027 0.294 
AEM           24,549  0.001 0.058 -0.023 0.001 0.027 
SIZE           24,549  6.192 2.062 4.815 6.243 7.548 
BTM           24,549  0.532 0.516 0.244 0.435 0.716 
ROA           24,549  -0.083 2.896 -0.034 0.036 0.080 
LEV           24,549  0.172 0.363 0.000 0.103 0.263 
EVOL           24,549  0.093 0.166 0.016 0.037 0.095 
CFVOL           24,549  0.067 0.086 0.021 0.041 0.076 
CYCLE           24,549  0.060 0.140 0.023 0.064 0.115 
SALES_GROWTH           24,549  0.004 0.140 0.000 0.001 0.002 
MKT_SHARE           24,549  0.064 0.053 0.033 0.043 0.078 
ZSCORE           24,549  0.573 4.494 0.463 1.601 2.490 
NOA           24,549  0.679 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000 
INSTOWN           24,549  0.549 0.413 0.083 0.610 0.906 
CEO_AGE            24,549  4.019 0.145 3.932 4.025 4.127 
CEO_TENURE            24,549  1.518 0.809 0.875 1.504 2.092 
BIG4           24,549  0.745 0.436 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
This table summarizes the sample descriptive statistics. The sample comprises 24,549 firm-years with 
BoardEx and other data over 1999–2015, representing 4,226 different firms. Appendix A defines the 
variables. 
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Table 3. CEO Network Size and RAM: OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
 OLS Two-stage Least Squares 
Dependent Variable = RAM RAM 
1st Stage 
NETWORK_TOT 
2nd Stage = 
RAM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NETWORK_TOT  0.0465 0.0388   0.6458 
 (2.95)*** (3.27)***   (2.38)** 
Controls:         
AEM 0.3096 0.2947 -0.0455 0.9120 
 (3.58)*** (3.23)*** (-2.45)** (2.53)** 
SIZE -0.0201 -0.0197 0.0440 -0.0588 
 (-2.40)** (-2.42)** (57.56)*** (-4.19)*** 
BTM 0.1746 0.1715 0.0267 0.0965 
 (4.14)*** (4.16)*** (10.73)*** (4.06)*** 
ROA 0.0021 0.0020 -0.0339 -0.7308 
 (0.57) (0.55) (-4.85)*** (-6.27)*** 
LEV 0.1654 0.1638 0.0469 0.3389 
 (4.40)*** (4.41)*** (7.48)*** (5.43)*** 
EVOL -0.1067 -0.0978 0.0116 -0.4453 
 (-0.89) (-0.78) (1.23) (-2.22)** 
CFVOL -1.1053 -1.0961 -0.0971 -0.7463 
 (-5.01)*** (-5.08)*** (-5.57)*** (-2.49)** 
CYCLE 0.2471 0.2368 -0.0003 0.0066 
 (2.04)** (1.96)* (-1.09) (0.82) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.1128 -0.1130 -0.0116 -0.0823 
 (-1.58) (-1.62) (-1.17) (-0.84) 
MKT_SHARE -0.1286 -0.1221 -0.0167 0.0075 
 (-0.96) (-0.89) (-0.53) (0.03) 
ZSCORE -0.0126 -0.0127 -0.0021 0.0185 
 (-3.66)*** (-3.66)*** (-5.63)*** (2.65)*** 
NOA 0.1147 0.1154 -0.0295 0.2127 
 (5.23)*** (5.36)*** (-10.11)*** (6.03)*** 
INSTOWN -0.0498 -0.0482 -0.0131 -0.1002 
 (-2.86)*** (-2.82)*** (-4.29)*** (-3.18)*** 
CEO_AGE   0.2904 0.0303 0.4679 
  (2.30)** (3.88)*** (4.54)*** 
CEO_TENURE   -0.0160 -0.0113 -0.0143 
  (-1.69)* (-8.11)*** (-0.81) 
Instrumental variables:     
DIR_SUPPLY100   0.0228  
   (2.14)**  
IND_NETWORK   0.8549  
   (18.91)***  
Partial F-Statistic 
Under-identification test (Chi square) 




Endogeneity Test (Chi square)   5.97 (<0.05) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,549 24,549 23,211 23,211 
Adjusted R2 0.0621 0.0636 0.219 0.0150 
 
This table reports the results of examining the effect of CEO network size on RAM. Columns 1 and 2 report the results 
of an OLS regression examining the effect of CEO network size on RAM. These columns present the OLS regression 
coefficients and two-sided t-values for the maximum samples of 24,549 firm-years. Columns 3 and 4 present the results 
of a two-stage regression using the executive/directors within 100 miles geographically and the industry average CEO 
total network size as the instrumental variables. In the first-stage regression the dependent variable is the CEO’s network 
size. In the second-stage regression RAM is the dependent variable and the predicted value of CEO network size is the 
test variable. We report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by industry and year. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables.  
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Table 4. CEO Network Size and RAM: Network Characteristics 
 
Variables RAM RAM RAM RAM RAM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NETWORK_TOT for executive directors (ED) 0.1794 
    
 
(11.72)*** 
    
NETWORK_TOT for non-executive (NED) 
 
0.0577 
   
  
(3.33)*** 









   
0.0455 
 




    
0.0622      
(2.34)** 
CONNECTED_RAM         0.2790 
          (2.66)*** 
Difference (ED – NED) 0.1217     
 (5.47)***     
Difference (S&P 500 – Other)   0.1447   
   (3.74)***   
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,549 24,549 24,549 24,549 18,847 
Adjusted R2 0.0636 0.0637 0.0637 0.0636 0.0199      
This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of CEO network characteristics on 
RAM for samples of 24,549 firm-years. The first two columns (1 and 2) are based on networks with 
executive (ED) versus non-executive (NED) directors. The next two columns (3 and 4) are based on the 
size of the firm (S&P 500 versus Other). The last column (5) controls for the prior three-year average level 
of RAM by the other firms in the CEO’s network in the same 48 Fama-French industry category. We report 
t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables.
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Table 5. RAM and Future Operating Performance 
 
Panel A: Conditional on CEO Network Size 
 
Network size Small Large Full Sample Small Large Full Sample 
Dependent Variable = ROA t+3 ROA t+3 ROA t+3 CFO t+3 CFO t+3 CFO t+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RAM 0.0035 -0.0039 0.0016 0.0010 -0.0038 0.0010 
 (2.18)** (-2.68)** (1.06) (1.04) (-2.27)** (1.06) 
DIFF (Large – Small) -0.0074   -0.0048   
 (-3.44)***   (-2.59)**   
SIZE 0.0432 0.0342 0.0395 0.0285 0.0263 0.0279 
 (13.71)*** (16.23)*** (16.13)*** (20.29)*** (19.36)*** (21.95)*** 
BTM 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 
 (3.16)*** (6.03)*** (6.96)*** (4.18)*** (6.37)*** (6.92)*** 
LEV -0.0321 -0.0679 -0.0589 0.0027 -0.0325 -0.0175 
 (-1.59) (-3.42)*** (-4.95)*** (0.26) (-3.05)*** (-4.46)*** 
RET 0.0031 0.0028 0.0029 0.0014 0.0020 0.0016 
 (7.77)*** (6.56)*** (7.49)*** (6.12)*** (10.30)*** (8.38)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
 (4.07)*** (1.84)* (3.91)*** (7.45)*** (1.01) (5.59)*** 
NETWORK_TOT   -0.0371   -0.0397 
   (-5.76)***   (-9.58)*** 
RAM* NETWORK_TOT   -0.0450   -0.0715 
   (-3.05)***   (-6.61)*** 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,820 8,664 17,484 8,765 8,625 17,390 
Adj. R2 0.141 0.215 0.163 0.168 0.229 0.195 
 
Continued on next page.  
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Table 5, contd. RAM and Future Operating Performance 
 
Panel B: Conditional on CEO Ownership 
 








Dependent Variable = ROA t+3 ROA t+3 CFO t+3 CFO t+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RAM 0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0019  
(2.05)** (-0.31) (-0.59) (-0.89) 
SIZE 0.0315 0.0370 0.0247 0.0271  
(10.12)*** (11.65)*** (13.36)*** (15.02)*** 
BTM -0.0046 0.0007 -0.0015 0.0001  
(-2.28)** (1.44) (-1.06) (0.33) 
LEV 0.0088 -0.0954 0.0191 -0.0426  
(0.53) (-3.30)*** (1.64) (-2.27)** 
RET 0.0014 0.0028 0.0009 0.0014  
(3.06)*** (5.30)*** (2.36)** (5.83)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0056 0.0014 0.0048 0.0005  
(1.67)* (2.06)** (2.50)** (1.10) 
NETWORK_TOT -0.0414 -0.0086 -0.0456 -0.0217 
 (-5.22)*** (-0.67) (-8.99)*** (-2.90)*** 
RAM* NETWORK_TOT -0.0164 0.0014 -0.0083 0.0043 
 (-8.51)*** (0.22) (-2.77)*** (1.50) 









Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,820 8,664 8,765 8,625 
Adj. R2 0.141 0.215 0.168 0.229 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of RAM on future operating 
performance, split on network size (Panel A) and CEO ownership (Panel B). We report t-statistics in 
parentheses with standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
level, respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables.  
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This table reports the result for a quantile regression analysis, examining the effect of CEO network 
size on RAM conditional on the size of  RAM. This table presents the OLS regression coefficients 
for samples of 24,549 firm-years. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables. 
 
  
  RAM 
INDEP NETWORK_TOT 
 Coeff. t-stat 
OLS 0.0388 (3.27)*** 
Quantile   
0.10 0.0875 (3.50)*** 
   
0.20 0.0567 (3.49)*** 
   
0.30 0.0347 (2.59)*** 
   
0.40 0.0171 (1.34) 
   
0.50 0.0073 (0.61) 
   
0.60 -0.0020 (-0.17) 
   
0.70 -0.0136 (-1.06) 
   
0.80 0.0119 (0.79) 
   
0.90 0.0114 (0.52) 
   
Observations  24,549 
Avg Pseudo R2  0.0866 
   
   
Q(0.90)=Q(0.10) -0.07610 -2.47** 
Q(0.80)=Q(0.20) -0.04480 -2.14** 
Q(0.90)=Q(0.50) 0.00410 0.19 
Q(0.10)=Q(0.50) 0.08020 3.09*** 
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Table 7. RAM, Earnings Benchmarks, and Future Operating Performance Conditional on Network Size 
 
Dependent variable =  CEO Network Size   CEO Network Size 
  Full Sample Bottom Tercile Top Tercile Full Sample Bottom Tercile Top Tercile 
Sample CFO t+1 CFO t+1 CFO t+1 ROA t+1 ROA t+1 ROA t+1 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BEAT 0.0008 0.0029 -0.0040 0.0115 0.0162 0.0082 
 (0.24) (0.62) (-0.93) (1.53) (1.50) (0.89) 
JUSTMISS -0.0040 0.0028 -0.0137 -0.0097 -0.0150 -0.0082 
 (-0.75) (0.46) (-1.99)** (-1.26) (-2.09)** (-1.09) 
BENCH 0.0003 0.0156 -0.0164 0.0004 0.0042 -0.0005 
 (0.05) (1.66)* (-5.04)*** (0.05) (0.34) (-0.10) 
RAM -0.0118 -0.0089 -0.0143 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0039 
 (-6.06)*** (-1.93)* (-5.01)*** (0.17) (0.12) (-1.35) 
BENCH*RAM 0.0006 -0.0142 0.0203 0.0124 0.0008 0.0181 
  (0.09) (-1.08) (1.76)* (1.69)* (0.05) (1.70)* 
DIFF (Top-Bottom)   0.0345     0.0173   
    (1.98)**    (0.90)   
ROA 0.3039 0.2927 0.3010 0.4429 0.4250 0.4115 
 (7.44)*** (6.02)*** (5.97)*** (8.44)*** (5.25)*** (6.80)*** 
SIZE 0.0074 0.0070 0.0072 0.0057 0.0023 0.0079 
 (5.66)*** (5.61)*** (4.42)*** (6.65)*** (1.95)* (5.92)*** 
BTM -0.0132 -0.0109 -0.0198 -0.0291 -0.0302 -0.0296 
 (-3.13)*** (-2.39)** (-3.75)*** (-4.63)*** (-4.50)*** (-2.71)*** 
RET -0.0010 0.0024 -0.0042 0.0077 0.0108 0.0074 
 (-0.97) (1.23) (-1.31) (3.62)*** (2.97)*** (1.84)* 
ZSCORE 0.0126 0.0155 0.0120 0.0151 0.0210 0.0133 
 (5.13)*** (5.17)*** (4.05)*** (4.54)*** (5.88)*** (3.88)*** 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,377 5,821 5,775 17,377 5,821 5,775 
Adjusted R2 0.460 0.466 0.457 0.448 0.465 0.418 
 
This table extends the model in Gunny (2010) by showing that the relation between RAM and CFOt+1 
(columns 1–3) and ROAt+1 (columns 4–6) when RAM is used to meet a benchmark varies conditional on 
CEO Network Size. The incremental effect of RAM on CFO/ROA to meet a benchmark is shown as the 
coefficient for BENCH*RAM. The difference in the coefficient for BENCH*RAM for large and small 
networks is the effect on BENCH*RAM of CEO Network Size. We report t-statistics in parentheses with 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables. 
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Table 8. CEO Network Size and RAM Conditional on CEO Share Ownership 
 
CEO Share Ownership Full Sample Lower Ownership Higher Ownership 
Dependent Variable RAM RAM RAM 
 (1) (2) (3)     
NETWORK_TOT 0.1202 0.0805 -0.1042  


















AEM 0.2635 0.6352 0.3092  
(3.44)*** (2.57)** (2.05)** 
SIZE -0.0170 0.0085 -0.0463  
(-2.22)** (4.53)*** (-3.09)*** 
BTM 0.2149 0.2645 0.1698  
(4.26)*** (6.06)*** (2.96)*** 
ROA -0.0780 -0.2539 -0.0767  
(-1.51) (-1.86)* (-1.29) 
LEV 0.2379 0.0424 0.3903  
(2.96)*** (0.61) (2.66)*** 
EVOL -0.1611 -0.3332 -0.1181  
(-1.26) (-1.21) (-1.27) 
CFVOL -1.2342 -1.0460 -1.2847  
(-3.78)*** (-2.27)** (-4.57)*** 
CYCLE 0.2726 0.2245 0.3179  
(1.94)* (1.27) (2.51)** 
SALES_GROWTH -0.2757 -1.7926 -0.3464  
(-1.32) (-0.67) (-1.38) 
MKT_SHARE -0.0944 -0.7129 0.5458  
(-0.38) (-2.45)** (1.55) 
ZSCORE -0.0109 -0.0118 -0.0064  
(-4.96)*** (-1.92)* (-0.81) 
NOA 0.1137 0.0128 0.1790  
(8.68)*** (1.04) (5.07)*** 
INSTOWN -0.1058 -0.0715 -0.0745 
 (-2.56)** (-2.52)** (-1.61) 
CEO_AGE 0.3002 0.3626 0.2045  
(2.24)** (2.04)** (1.50) 
CEO_TENURE -0.0002 -0.0203 0.0134  
(-0.01) (-0.94) (0.64) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,637 5,812 5,825 
Adjusted R2 0.0753 0.0893 0.0678 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of CEO network size on RAM 
conditional on the degree of CEO ownership in the firm. We report t-statistics in parentheses with 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables. 
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Table 9. CEO Network Size and Restatements 
 
Dependent variable = Restatement Restatement 
NETWORK_TOT -0.4248 -0.4279 
 (-2.30)** (-2.26)** 
AEM t-1 -0.4066 -0.4430 
 (-0.69) (-0.74) 
AEM t-2 0.6487 0.5802 
 (1.28) (1.16) 
SIZE -0.0516 -0.0506 
 (-1.63) (-1.65)* 
BTM 0.0146 -0.0066 
 (0.11) (-0.05) 
ROA 0.0205 0.0234 
 (0.09) (0.11) 
LEV 0.3377 0.3352 
 (1.99)** (2.01)** 
EVOL 0.0217 0.0961 
 (0.04) (0.18) 
CFVOL -0.3459 -0.2969 
 (-0.58) (-0.48) 
CYCLE -0.0133 -0.0134 
 (-4.55)*** (-4.35)*** 
SALESGROWTH -9.7095 -9.0889 
 (-1.47) (-1.42) 
HHI -0.4463 -0.3885 
 (-0.79) (-0.71) 
ZSCORE -0.0105 -0.0134 
 (-0.75) (-0.98) 
NOA -0.0448 -0.0393 
 (-0.50) (-0.46) 
INSTOWN 0.1863 0.2041 
  (1.58) (1.70)* 
BIG4 0.0742 0.0922 
 (0.82) (1.00) 
LNAGE  0.7620 
  (3.33)*** 
LNTENTURE  0.0109 
  (0.27) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 10,380 10,380 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.0405 
 
This table reports the results of examining the effect of CEO network size on Restatement. It reports the 
results of an OLS regression examining the effect of CEO network size on RAM. These columns present 
the logistic regression coefficients and two-sided t-values for the maximum samples of 10,380 firm-years. 
We report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by industry and year. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables. 
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Table 10. CEO Network Size and AEM 
 
   Level of Earnings Management 
      Small Large 
Dependent Variable = AEM AEM AEM AEM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NETWORK_TOT -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0017 -0.0103  
(-3.07)*** (-3.08)*** (-2.00)** (-2.70)*** 




   
(-2.36)** 
 
RAM 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0021  
(2.05)** (1.98)** (-4.17)*** (2.51)** 
SIZE -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002  
(-0.26) (-0.26) (1.46) (-0.22) 
BTM -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0000 -0.0041  
(-0.89) (-0.92) (0.07) (-1.21) 
ROA 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003  
(2.39)** (2.38)** (0.68) (1.88)* 
LEV 0.0044 0.0043 0.0000 0.0052  
(2.39)** (2.35)** (0.08) (2.29)** 
EVOL 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0018 0.0036  
(0.05) (0.12) (-2.31)** (0.41) 
CFVOL 0.0042 0.0046 0.0042 0.0047  
(0.53) (0.58) (1.64) (0.40) 
CYCLE 0.0125 0.0122 0.0012 0.0195  
(2.45)** (2.38)** (0.89) (1.96)* 
SALES_GROWTH 0.0054 0.0054 0.0003 0.0087  
(1.39) (1.37) (1.78)* (1.94)* 
MKT_SHARE 0.0122 0.0123 -0.0026 0.0263  
(0.79) (0.80) (-0.69) (0.94) 
ZSCORE 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0010  
(2.55)** (2.56)** (-1.54) (2.77)*** 
NOA 0.0042 0.0042 0.0003 0.0079  
(2.51)** (2.51)** (0.59) (2.64)*** 
 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0041 
 (-1.83)* (-1.81)* (-1.32) (-1.48) 
BIG4 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003  
(-0.49) (-0.19) (-1.09) (0.13) 
CEO_AGE  
 
0.0090 0.0017 0.0167   
(1.82)* (2.32)** (1.83)* 
CEO_TENURE  
 
-0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003   
(-0.31) (0.73) (-0.26) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,549 24,549 12,284 12,265 
Adjusted R2 0.0234 0.0237 0.0131 0.0376 
 
This table reports the results of examining the effect of CEO network size on AEM. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the results of an OLS regression examining the effect of CEO network size on RAM. These columns 
present the OLS regression coefficients and two-sided t-values for the maximum samples of 24,549 firm-
years. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of examining the effect of CEO network size on AEM, after 
splitting our sample into Large and Small subgroups of AEM, based on the sample median of AEM. We 
report t-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered by industry and year. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, all two-tailed. Appendix A defines the variables. 
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Table A CEO Network Size and RAM: Alternative Measures of Network Size 
 
Dependent variable =  Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector rDegree 
Betweenness 0.1270    
 (3.20)***    
Closeness  0.4022   
  (2.04)**   
Eigenvector   -0.0173  
   (-0.20)  
rDegree    6.7115 
    (2.73)*** 
AEM 0.2936 0.2936 0.2924 0.2957 
 (3.24)*** (3.20)*** (3.24)*** (3.24)*** 
SIZE -0.0195 -0.0208 -0.0178 -0.0200 
 (-2.33)** (-2.51)** (-2.18)** (-2.60)*** 
BTM 0.1713 0.1709 0.1727 0.1711 
 (4.13)*** (4.15)*** (4.17)*** (4.17)*** 
ROA 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 
 (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) 
LEV 0.1642 0.1631 0.1645 0.1639 
 (4.38)*** (4.35)*** (4.38)*** (4.37)*** 
EVOL -0.0982 -0.1007 -0.0969 -0.0987 
 (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.79) 
CFVOL -1.0953 -1.0886 -1.1006 -1.0941 
 (-5.03)*** (-5.03)*** (-5.05)*** (-5.07)*** 
CYCLE 0.2374 0.2351 0.2364 0.2376 
 (1.96)* (1.96)* (1.95)* (1.97)** 
SALES_GROWTH -0.1128 -0.1121 -0.1129 -0.1128 
 (-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.62) (-1.62) 
MKT_SHARE -0.1260 -0.1249 -0.1212 -0.1276 
 (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.93) 
ZSCORE -0.0127 -0.0125 -0.0129 -0.0127 
 (-3.59)*** (-3.62)*** (-3.63)*** (-3.65)*** 
NOA 0.1155 0.1156 0.1139 0.1161 
 (5.28)*** (5.31)*** (5.18)*** (5.36)*** 
CEO_AGE  -0.0467 -0.0511 -0.0488 -0.0477 
 (-2.75)*** (-3.02)*** (-2.83)*** (-2.77)*** 
INSTOWN 0.2845 0.2907 0.2921 0.2901 
 (2.24)** (2.31)** (2.29)** (2.30)** 
CEO_TENURE  -0.0161 -0.0143 -0.0166 -0.0154 
 (-1.67)* (-1.45) (-1.70)* (-1.57) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 24,549 24,549 24,549 24,549 
Adjusted R2 0.0638 0.0637 0.0636 0.0637 
 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression examining the effect of CEO network size on RAM 
by using Alternative Network Measures for samples of 24,549 firm-years. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, all two-tailed. Betweenness = how frequently 
the CEO lies on the shortest path between two other individuals in the network; Closeness = the number 
of indirect as well as direct connections; Eigenvector = how central are the individuals connected to the 
CEO; rDegree = the number of first-degree connections in the network relative to total network degree. 
See Liu (2014) for further details of these definitions. Appendix A defines the remaining variables. 
 
